A short while after the Israeli invasion into Lebanon in June 1982 (called in Israel Tthe First Lebanon War), Azriel Nevo, the military secretary to Prime Minister Menachem Begin, began secretly receiving messages from different officials, mainly from the military.
The IDF—under the command of Chief of Staff Rafael “Raful” Eitan, and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon—was fast advancing deep into Lebanon. But Nevo was hearing more and more claims that a worrying disparity existed between what was being presented to Begin and his government, and what was actually happening on the ground.
“I felt that there was real fear of Raful or Sharon that (prevented officials from) speaking the truth or openly speaking their minds,” Nevo recalled about those stormy days. “That’s why they secretly passed me all types of information – so I would pass it on to the prime minister. Officers began to hint to me that something was wrong.”
The reports made Nevo fear that Prime Minister Begin was being duped by his defense minister; that while Begin truly thought that the operation in Lebanon was a limited operation to push terrorist groups away from the northern border—Sharon had a different agenda.
“Under Sharon’s orders,” Nevo said, “the IDF was cascading into something much more wide-reaching than what was approved by the government.”
One of the officers who warned Nevo was the head of the Operations Division at the time, Uri Sagi, who went on to become the head of Military Intelligence.
“Sagi invited me to his office in ‘the pit’ (the subterranean fortified IDF command bunker situated under the center of Tel Aviv—RB) and said to me, ‘Azriel, come look at the maps. Things aren’t exactly as they’re being presented to you.'”
Sagi remembered those tense times well. “Formally, for the sake of the minutes, Sharon presented everything to the government, but he didn’t explain the significance of the actions he was presenting,” he recounted. At the time, Sagi said, “I thought the government didn’t understand what it was seeing and hearing. For example, one of the objectives of the war—changing the government in Lebanon—was not something feasible for the IDF to do. In addition, Begin decided that the IDF would not fight the Syrian military, but two of the arrows showing how the IDF would advance showed the army moving through territory that the Syrians controlled—something which created the very likely possibility of a confrontation with them. I believed all of these things should be explained to the prime minister, and that’s what I told Azriel.”
According to Sagi, another painful subject came up during his meetings with Nevo: the estimates of war’s casualties. “I told Azriel about a war game codenamed ‘Roses,’ which was held before the outbreak of the war, which the political leadership didn’t attend. In ‘Roses,’ the estimated casualty numbers were significantly higher than what was presented to the government,” Sagi says. “In the war game, we ‘made it’ all the way to Beirut, a lot farther than what we presented to the government, and the operation was significantly longer than the estimates provided to the government forecasted.”
And this was the situation he found himself in: A relatively young lieutenant colonel—Nevo was only 34 at the time—worried that his superiors, the minister of defense and the IDF chief of staff, were lying to the prime minister, the person for whom Nevo was supposed to serve as a link to the military.
In the background was a war that was becoming more and more complicated, with many dead and wounded. So now what?
***
This was the complicated situation that arose during the Lebanon War – and this was definitely not the only dilemma Azriel Nevo had to deal with. Over the eleven and half years that he served as military secretary to the prime minister, he was placed in one of the most sensitive positions in the country.
He was positioned at an important juncture through which critical and secret information flowed from the intelligence and military branches to the prime minister and, on the other hand, the prime minister’s instruction and requests were passed to the intelligence and military branches. Because of this, some say that the military secretary to the prime minister is exposed to the largest amount of sensitive and secret information of anyone in the country.
Nevo served in his position for longer than any other military secretary, and did it under no less than four prime ministers who couldn’t have been more different from one another: Begin, Shamir, Peres, and Rabin. The fact that at least some of these people were embroiled in conflict with each other, and the fact they didn’t dismiss Nevo, is indicative of the high level of confidence that they all had in him.
Nevo has just released a book called “The Military Secretary” (published by Contento Now), which is based on a series of long conversations Nevo had with Attorney Haim Mashgav. It is a fascinating read that provides a rare glimpse into several of the most dramatic affairs in Israeli history that took place on Nevo’s watch, and remarkable testimonies of those who were there, deep in the decision-making process—when the decision was made to bomb the Iraqi reactor, when the Pollard, 300 Bus and the Iran–Contra affairs blew up; during the Lebanon War and the assassination of Abu Jihad (Khalil al-Wazir, one of the co-founders of Fatah —ed.), and more.
“Everyone I served under had the same title: prime minister,” Nevo said, “but they were all very different from each other.”
Nevo himself grew up in a Betar (Revisionist Zionist youth movement—ed.) household, and, as a consequence, really respected Begin, but says that Shamir was the easiest and most effective to work with. He respected Peres’s drive and hard work but thought that some of that work was unnecessary and disapproved of the “men in suits” who surrounded him.
He also really respected Yitzhak Rabin, but does not spare him criticism in his book, claiming Rabin didn’t understand, in real time, the significance of the First Intifada when it had just broken out, and rejected an offer on Ron Arad, an IAF navigator who was captured by a Lebanese terror organization, when it was still possible to save him.
Even now, at the age of 68, Nevo continues to see his role as that of a soldier: “I was never in the spotlight. My job was to serve the prime minister. I don’t have policies of my own. I don’t decide anything on my own. In my opinion, it was also the secret to my survival in the position for so long: I never used my ties to the prime minister with others, and I never claimed to the prime minister that I knew things I didn’t. I think that ‘I don’t know’ and ‘I will check’ are great answers. Don’t ever speak off the cuff.
“I was actually a ‘waiter’ serving information to the prime minister, and as such, one of my duties was to distinguish between the important and the unimportant: not to give the prime minister too little, so that he knows just enough about what’s happening, but also not give too much and bombard him with reports, information, and details, so that he doesn’t collapse.”
Due to lack of space, amongst the many affairs and stories that Nevo was involved in, we chose to focus on five events: the strike on the Iraqi reactor, the outbreak of the First Lebanon War, the mystery surrounding Begin’s retirement (“I can’t go on anymore”), the 300 Bus affair, and the Pollard affair. This is what it looks like behind the scenes, in real time.
The Iraqi reactor: ‘What conspiracy?’
Nevo came to his position from Aman (the IDF’s Intelligence Directorate) and after having served as the prime minister’s advisor on the war on terror. He was initially appointed as an assistant to Efraim Poran, the military secretary that Begin “inherited” from Rabin. Iraq’s nuclear project was at the center of things at the time.
“The monitoring of Saddam Hussein’s attempts to obtain a nuclear weapon started during Rabin’s first term as prime minister. Begin inherited the issue.”
It was later claimed that Begin planned the attack on the Iraqi reactor close to the planned elections (which the Likud ended up winning by a small margin). But Nevo rejects these claims out of hand. The operation was originally planned for May 1981, but the plan was leaked to the head of the opposition, Shimon Peres, who then wrote Prime Minister Begin urging him not to go through with the operation. Begin didn’t change his mind, but because of the leak, he changed the date of the operation.
“It was decided to postpone the operation and to change all of the code words,” Nevo recalled. “This story also shows that the claims made against Begin, saying he planned the timing of the operation to take place close to the elections, are baseless.”
It was claimed that Begin initially accepted the recommendation of Aman not to admit to the attack and leave it to speculation that the Iranians might have committed it, and he then changed his mind and proudly claimed responsibility to win the elections, which worked well for him.
“This is another legend, just one of many. The bombardment was on the eve of Shavuot. The next day, on the holiday, I got a call from Aman’s OSINT unit (the Open Source Intelligence unit, responsible for monitoring foreign media —RB) and was told that there are countless of reports that tie us to the attack, including statements by King Hussein, who saw the planes from his yacht in the Gulf of Aqaba.
“I called Begin and briefed him on that. Begin thought for a moment and said, ‘If that’s the case, then we have to issue an official statement.’ That’s all that happened. Because of my call, which could have not been made at all, a statement was issued. It’s not some complex conspiracy by Begin.”
With Poran’s resignation, Begin offered the job to Nevo. Nevo was not the candidate the military thought to recommend, but Begin told him, “I trust you; I don’t need a general,” and he forced the appointment on the IDF. Thus, a young and relatively junior officer came to be at one of the most sensitive junctures at the top of Israel’s leadership.
Lebanon War: ‘Something wasn’t adding up’
During 1981, the same year that Nevo was appointed the prime minister’s military secretary, the IDF began to prepare for war in Lebanon, which broke out a year later.
“The Lebanon War started because of the justified desire of the prime minister and others—a desire which I supported as well—to remove the threat to the northern communities,” recalls Nevo.
“The reality of katyusha rockets fired at Israeli cities was really unbearable. Begin believed the IDF was going on a limited operation; just as far as the longest-range artillery the terrorists had could reach, something like 40 kilometers. The problem was that Defense Minister Sharon probably had a completely different agenda and far bigger goals, and he did not really share them with the prime minister and the rest of the government.”
The war started “with a great euphoria,” recalls Nevo, “but soon we started feeling that something here did not add up. Suddenly, we began seeing more and more casualties among our forces. I realized that little by little, we were sinking deeper and deeper into quicksand.
“The IDF’s estimation of casualties before the war was completely wrong. Very soon, I saw that the 40 km plan was dissolving, and the IDF was advancing deeper into Lebanon. At the same time, contrary to the plans and promises, we started fighting the Syrians.”
Nevo attributes part of the problem to Begin’s admiration for the boys in uniform. “Begin did not believe someone in uniform would tell him something that is not true. I found myself in a terrible place in which I, a young and junior officer, had to tell Begin that he was being lied to by the commanders of the army.”
Nevo stresses that Sharon “in his clever and cunning way,” received the go-ahead for each one of his operations. “He demanded that a meeting be held every day, and he sat there with his little notebook and wrote down everything. But it soon turned out that these were ongoing actions, which had begun at one point and ended somewhere else entirely.”
According to Nevo, only a few in the government openly opposed Sharon at the time. The best known among them was the communications minister, Mordechai Tzipori, who was a brigadier general in reserves. Later, cabinet secretary Dan Meridor also helped Nevo in talks with Begin. There were others – one of them, Nevo says, was none other than the prime minister’s son, Benny Begin. “The IDF used his help in planning battles because of his expertise on tanks, and because of that he knew the war plans. He also warned his father that Sharon was leading him astray.
“To be fair, it is important to note in this context that the man that was closest to Begin, Yehiel Kadishai (Begin’s chief of staff —RB) claimed until his last day that I was wrong and misleading. He said that I did not understand Begin, that he wanted to get to Beirut and kick Fatah out of Lebanon and that Sharon was not deceiving him in any way.”
Weren’t you afraid of Sharon? You were a soldier, and he was the defense minister.
“No, I was not afraid, and the way I saw my role was that I was nominally subordinate to the IDF, but in fact my loyalty should be, above all, to the prime minister. This loyalty, of course, led me to severe clashes. Whenever Uri Dan, one of Sharon’s close advisors, would see me or Dan Meridor, he would point at us and ask sarcastically, ‘Well, are you done with your slander?’ or, ‘Have you told Begin your nonsense yet?'”
Dan Meridor said in response, “Azriel is right. At that time, we had a very strong connection, among other things because of the Lebanon War. We thought that both the government and the prime minister were not getting complete and accurate reports about the war and its real objectives. Sharon and his close circle marked us as problematic and fought against us. Azriel always spoke the truth and withstood this difficult situation—facing the immense power of Raful and Sharon—with determination and honor.”
In contrast, Gilad Sharon, the son of the late prime minister, outright rejects Nevo’s claims. “If that’s what Azriel Nevo thought during the war, he was obligated to shout and warn as loudly as possible. Otherwise, he himself is criminally derelict in his duty. But he chose to remain silent for 30-some years, and only when he thought no one would react to his fabrications, he published these fairytales.”
The turning point in that period was of course the massacre committed by the Christian Phalangist forces at the refugee camps Sabra and Shatila. Nevo claims that neither he nor Begin could have known what was to follow. “Israel was unjustly accused of direct involvement in the massacre. This is absolutely false. Our problem was that we failed to realize that these people had no problem pulling out a knife and slaughtering anyone they wanted, including us.”
The commission of inquiry reprimanded for Begin letting the Phalangists into the camp.
“As I recall, Begin was unaware of the approval granted to the Phalangists to enter the camps. Sharon and the IDF leadership did not go into that detail with him. Begin first heard about what was going on in the camps from BBC broadcasts.”
Begin’s resignation: ‘He completely gave up’
“At some point,” says Nevo, “I noticed a phenomenon that was getting worse: Begin would arrive at his office in the morning bleary-eyed, even though I made a decision not to wake him up in the middle of the night. When I would start reporting to him what had happened during the night, he would interrupt me in an angry tone and say, ‘I’ve heard about this from the defense minister already.’
Arik was calling him frequently in the middle of the night, and simply robbing him of his sleep. Sharon was telling Begin about the number of wounded and dead, the advancement of the forces, bothering him and harassing him. I felt that Sharon was doing this on purpose to exhaust the prime minister. It happened dozens of times and it began to destroy Begin. I was watching him get worse every day.”
Of all the horrors of war, it was the reports of the fallen soldiers that weighed most heavily on Begin. “The most important thing for Begin was that ‘our boys’ return safely. When I gave him reports of the fatalities, his response was very emotional. You could feel just how much it hurt him; it really wounded him from the inside. His intentions were good, to go out and protect the communities in the north. And then all of a sudden, he found himself in a war that went totally wrong.
“One day, I told Begin that police minister Yosef Burg had suggested removing the demonstrators that were under the window of his office and moving them a few blocks away, so he won’t have to hear the awful accusations that he and Sharon were ‘murderers.’ He replied, ‘No way. It’s their right to protest.’
“Slowly, I saw Begin wither away, withdrawing into himself. I was a ‘youngster’ at the time, and I looked up to him. Suddenly, he seemed very old to me. Thinking back on it, Begin was 69 at the time, almost my age today, not very old, but he was just weary and sad. The death of his wife Aliza broke him completely.”
So what happened to Begin? It is said he suffered from severe depression.
“I can’t make medical diagnoses, but it was evident that it was harder for him every day. He realized that Sharon misled him, that he was stuck in quicksand. He was a very sensitive man, too sensitive. Begin became depressed, did not always communicate and stopped shaving.
“Following the death of his wife and before he became a recluse, he was already in a deep depression. I called it ‘the teacup period’: Begin would fall asleep in the middle of meetings, including the most sensitive ones, and I started stirring my cup of tea vigorously to wake him up. It was a very dismal time.”
At some point, Begin stopped coming into the office and locked himself in the prime minister’s residence. Nevo made great efforts to hide his absence. “The office secretaries went about their daily routine, and every day they released the prime minister’s schedule, but nothing was written on it, because he did not meet with anyone. To hide this, I instructed that the schedule be classified as ‘top secret’ so that no one could see it.”
In fact, at that time, Begin was not even involved in the state’s affairs, and “the state was led by three people, none of them elected officials: Dan Meridor, Yehiel Kadishai, and myself.”
How do you examine your actions after the fact?
“With quite a lot of criticism. I think all three of us have sinned. You cannot hide the fact that the prime minister was actually not functioning. It’s reminiscent of dictatorships.”
The last time Nevo saw Begin as the prime minister was at the famous meeting where he announced that “I cannot carry on anymore.”
“He sent his letter of resignation to the president via a messenger, giving some false excuse that there were nicks and cuts on his face that prevented him from shaving, and he didn’t want to face the president unshaven. To my surprise, although the ministers were aware of the situation and knew that he hadn’t been running the show for some time, they really pressed him to stay. I said, ‘Guys, what do you want from him? Let him go. Can’t you see he really can’t carry on anymore!?'”
300 Bus Affair: ‘It’s a slippery slope’
Thursday evening, April 12, 1984, at Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s office, reports were starting to come in about a security incident on the Tel Aviv–Ashkelon highway.
Four terrorists hijacked an Egged bus. Later, the bus line number, 300, also became the name of the affair that shook the nation’s top echelons. Nevo himself declares that despite his experiences during the Lebanon War, this affair is where he “lost his innocence.”
“Until the 300 Bus Affair, I was very naive in my approach to the IDF and the intelligence community. I believed everyone. And perhaps this is how it should be. The military secretary is not an investigating authority that checks if the intelligence chiefs are telling him the truth. If you start lying, you know, it’s a slippery slope; a small lie grows to a giant snowball.”
The report that Nevo received about the kidnapping and subsequent takeover of the 300 Bus was confusing: “They told us Sayeret Matkal (the elite General Staff Reconnaissance Unit—RB) took over the bus, that a passenger and two terrorists were killed and that two terrorists were captured alive. Later, the report was amended and said that all four terrorists were killed during the takeover. It did not seem strange to me. I reported this to Prime Minister Shamir, and for me that was the end of it. Or at least so I thought.”
But this, of course, was only the beginning. “In my naivety, I could not even imagine that there was something here, until the publication of the photo (Alex Levac’s famous photograph, showing one of the terrorists alive and well after the takeover, a short time before he was found dead —RB). In fact, even then, I had yet to realize the implications of the incident.”
The issue of killing the terrorists, says Nevo, would not have bothered Shamir in a different kind of situation. “Look, Shamir wasn’t exactly a ‘vegetarian.’ I’d worked with Shamir for seven years, and I was fonder of him than the other prime ministers with whom I worked—he was precise and fair, a friendly man who talked to others at eye level. Every time he gave an order, he gave it properly. No hinting or implying, no winking. If he had given the order to kill the terrorists, he would have stood behind his decision without a problem.”
But Shamir did not give that order. Only later it turned out that the order came from the Shin Bet, and that the agency’s leadership kept trying to dump the responsibility on someone else (on Prime Minister Shamir and Defense Minister Moshe Arens) and when they denied it, the Shin Bet tried to lay the blame on Brig. Gen. Yitzhak Mordechai, who was the chief infantry and paratrooper officer at the time. “All attempts by Avrum (Shin Bet Chief Avraham Shalom —RB) to lay the blame first on Arens and then on Shamir were lies. After all, if such an order was given, it would have been in my presence and with my knowledge. Such a thing never happened.”
Initially, the prime ministers that had to deal with the affair, Shamir and Peres (and later on, Rabin as the defense minister), gave their full support to the Shin Bet. Nevo encouraged them to do so. “They also lied to me, without even hesitating, saying that the Shin Bet did not kill the two Palestinians, but rather it were IDF soldiers that cruelly lynched them.
“I realized that Itzik Mordechai was in grave danger. At the time, we were on a general-staff seminar in Ma’ale Hachamisha, and I went to him and told him, ‘Itzik, I think that you should get a lawyer.’ He reacted with a dismissive gesture, saying, ‘Stop talking nonsense; what are you talking about?’ No one could imagine how low the Shin Bet could go. They played me, too, over the years. Fed me false information and misled me.”
For example?
“In the middle of the night, while the affair was ongoing, Ram Caspi called me at home. He was one of the private lawyers recruited by politicians to help with security affairs, whose very presence and involvement I really did not like. He told me that tempers were high in the Shin Bet and that I shoukd calm them down. He asked that I come to the agency’s headquarters urgently.
“The intention was obviously to use me to deliver a message to the prime minister—that we must calm down the situation. The prime minister accepted this argument and wanted to take it off the public agenda. They feared a maelstrom that would eventually take them down as well.
“The act itself, the assassination of the terrorists that were alive after the takeover, is very grave. But even graver is the fact it was covered up. This whole affair should have ended with an extensive police investigation, with all that entails. Unfortunately, that did not happen. The affair was covered up and buried.”
There was a report that alleged there was a special committee, “Committee X,” that supposedly confirms that they were executed.
“That’s not true. It’s the prime minister who authorizes these kinds of actions. Sometimes, the prime minister doesn’t want to make the decision on his own, so he consults with other ministers or with the Security Cabinet. For instance, Shamir brought to the cabinet the decision on whether to assassinate Abu Jihad (Fatah co-founder Khalil al-Wazir—ed.). The cabinet made a decision in principle to authorize the prime minister to order the assassination at the right time. Shamir met with the head of Military Intelligence, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, and it was only after a long conversation with him that he decided to authorize the operation.”
Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhak Mordechai declined to comment. Ram Caspi said in response, “I don’t intend on adding to or diminishing from the words of my good friend Azriel Nevo and will only say this: despite the fact that over 30 years have passed since the events in question, I remember them well. And, in real time, I did not hear from Azriel the things he claims today that, in his opinion, should have been investigated by police.
“Perhaps this is his opinion in hindsight; but the unequivocal position of the late Yitzhak Shamir, the late Yitzhak Rabin and of Shimon Peres (may he continue to live a long life), which led, and rightly so, to the pardoning of the Shin Bet operatives by the late President Chaim Herzog, is what decided this. A day will come, perhaps in 30 years, when I will explain these things in more detail.”
The Pollard Affair: A confession
During the 80s, there was a series of scandals that touched on the intelligence community and its relations with the political leadership. Nevo sees similarities among some of these affairs, especially in the involvement of elements from outside the system, such as lawyers and various consultants, as well as a pattern of intelligence agencies operating under the political echelon’s radar and without supervision. This was the case with the Pollard Affair.
The affair broke out on the international stage with an explosion of media attention in November 1985, when Jonathan Pollard was arrested on suspicion of spying on the United States for Israel.
For years, questions arose, such as how high in the state’s leadership did the knowledge go that Israel operates spies on the territory of its closest ally. Nevo denies that he knew anything prior to Pollard’s arrest. “I tell you humbly and under oath: I did not know, nor did the prime ministers Shamir and Peres.”
But the material that he handed over had enormous value, and the intelligence documents were highly classified American documents. Where did you think all this came from?
“We had no idea because we didn’t see the material. We don’t see everything, and Rafi Eitan (Pollard’s handler —ed.) did not show us this. By the way, I admired Rafi. You could almost see the wheels of his brain turning and developing a new idea or a sophisticated campaign. I would laugh whenever he turned off his hearing aids when he came to the conclusion that people were talking nonsense around him. Perhaps he wanted to prove he was worthy of being the head of the Mossad—but he made a huge mistake in recruiting and operating Pollard.
“Once we realized the size of the catastrophe, we tried to find a way out from that labyrinth. It was very important to quiet the press in Israel, and I convened the editor’s committee in the cabinet meeting room. Peres sat with them, told them pretty much what happened and got them to promise not to get involved in the matter.”
But what did you think would solve the mishap?
“We were hoping that if we apologized and said, ‘mea culpa,’ this should minimize the damage and dissipate the anger of the Americans. It was a mistake. The Americans resented it, and they might still resent us to this day.”
Rafi Eitan said in response, “Nevo speaks the truth.”
***
In the eleven and a half years Nevo served in his role, he saw the bright side of the Israeli leadership, but also quite a bit of its ugly side. Nevo was there, for example, when, with the aim of preventing the appointment of his successor, Dan Shomron, IDF chief of staff Moshe Levy whispered in the ears of executives at the top that Shomron was gay.
“That was a very ugly affair. Suddenly the rumors started flying around, and I had to go to Shamir and talk with him. He was shocked by the whole thing. Even saying the word ‘gay’ near Shamir made him shudder. Then they called the former chief medical officer Eran Dolev, and he did an investigation and found out that the whole story was nonsense. They spilled the blood of Shomron. An ugly act. ”
In 1993, Nevo finished his term and was sent to serve as the military attaché in the UK and Ireland. Since his release from the army at the rank of brigadier general in 1997, Nevo has been a member of numerous boards of directors, including Bezeq, Israel Electric, Ami-Gur. Today, he is the chairman of the Levinsky College of Education. He is married to Nili, a father of three daughters and grandfather of five grandchildren.
What are the lessons you’ve learned from the affairs you’ve witnessed at the prime minister’s office?
“First, there was here a serious problem with procedures and the conduct of state agencies, including lying and fabricating evidence. Things should have been investigated thoroughly, but they were not investigated.
“In addition, in some of the affairs, external individuals who did not hold an official position—just temporary emissaries and the like—negatively interfered. This is the kind of thing, putting it delicately, that was not good. I, for example, disliked Amnon Goldenberg’s suggestion to the Mossad to try to sue Victor Ostrovsky (a former Mossad cadet who published a book on the Mossad’s operations overseas—RB) in American and Canadian courts to prevent him from publishing the book.”
Do you think they should have killed Victor Ostrovsky?
“I have difficulty saying ‘kill him.’ Without a doubt, in my opinion, he was crap. I definitely think that he should have been neutralized one way or another. At the time, there were ideas to kidnap him, but they did not pan out, unfortunately.”
Should Mordechai Vanunu (the Dimona reactor technician who leaked nuclear secrets to the Sunday Times) have been killed?
“I think Israel behaved exceptionally well in the Vanunu affair. I was in favor of kidnapping him—he committed a most serious crime and he had to be punished to deter others, but not kill him. It never occurred to us. Peres decided not to kidnap him on British soil, because the consequences were likely to be extremely serious. So they did it elsewhere.”
You worked very closely with four prime ministers. Does the Israeli public have someone they can trust?
“Not a simple question. I can say that in my time, despite all the differences between the prime ministers, there was someone to trust. There were blunders and mishaps and problems, but I saw all four of them as serious and caring. You saw men in that position who were truly troubled and concern for the people of Israel. Whoever comes after them should draw a lot of conclusions and learn from their mistakes.”
‘Where have you been all these years?’
Gilad Sharon, the son of former prime minister Ariel Sharon, responded to Azriel Nevo.
If that’s what Azriel Nevo thought during the war, he was obligated to shout and warn as loudly as possible. Otherwise, he himself is criminally derelict in his duty. But he chose to remain silent for 30-some years, and only when he thought no one would react to his fabrications, he published these fairytales. When it thought the lion was not around, the mouse crawled out of the hole where he had sunk into oblivion for decades. Nevo then began to throw mud. How else can he make it into the newspaper?
How would the world remember that there was once an Azriel-something? Over the years, he tried to present Prime Minister Begin as someone who was not aware of what was going on during the war and had no control over his government. To portray Begin in that manner is to do him a great injustice. The following are quotes from a Channel 1 interview with Begin on June 15, 1982:
Yaakov Ahimeir: “You may be aware that in parts of the public … there is a fear or suspicion that Defense Minister Ariel Sharon dragged the government into maneuvers that deviated from the original plan of the operation.”
Menachem Begin: “… Nonsense. That never happened … what sort of dragging; it was a functioning government, it held meetings sometimes twice a day. Every fact was reported to it; every detail was discussed. There was a decision made for everything. No one dragged the government, no one was pulling it (in any direction), and why should the defense minister, a man experienced in combat, a true patriot, whose heart and soul are devoted to the nation, drag the government … That never happened … there was no deception and there was no dragging; things happened based to the government’s decisions.”
In a cabinet meeting on June 5, 1982, the day before the war began, Begin said, “The government will keep its finger on the pulse during this operation, at all times. If conquering Beirut is necessary, the government will decide that. Nothing is going to happen automatically.”
At a cabinet meeting on August 1, 1982, Begin said, “If there is no choice, we’ll enter Beirut at the appropriate time; I will recommend it. We can’t say that we won’t go into Beirut. Saying so would be very damaging for us … We will prepare and decide. Whoever says today that we must not enter west Beirut, helps the PLO stay there.”
Does that sound like a detached prime minister, who was led unknowingly? Absolutely not. Begin controlled his government and ran it.
Yechiel Kadishai, who was the closest person to Begin, he was his assistant for 50 years and dined with Begin until his last day. He wrote on June 12, 1996, “I was asked if Sharon lied to Menachem Begin. To which I replied then, as I do so today: Arik Sharon did not lie to him.”
Azriel Nevo never wanted what was best for Sharon, but rather just the opposite. In an interview that he gave about 30 years after those events to the Ma’ariv newspaper he suddenly “remembered” how Sharon would call to report to Begin at night and that it was taxing for the prime minister. Where was Nevo all these years? Why was he silent? But even he, when asked directly in the same interview, “Did Begin ever speak, even in intimate settings, against Sharon?” he replied, “Never.”
The second Begin government, in which Sharon served as defense minister, would not accept a situation in which the northern communities are under fire and thus “held hostage” by terrorist groups. After less than a week, the IDF achieved the campaign’s objective: ceasing the fire on northern Israel. Eleven weeks after the start of the operation, the deportation of about 15,000 terrorists and Syrian troops from Beirut began.
By comparison, in the Second Lebanon War, in which I served as a reserve officer in the area, the IDF, after a month, more or less, got pretty much nowhere. The cessation of rocket fire, which was a central objective in the war, was not achieved on the battlefield, but only following a ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah. Compared to that, one can only appreciate Begin and Sharon’s achievement.
